Economic Policy Coordination in EMU: Institutional and Political Requirements. CES Germany & Europe Working Paper no. 01.5, October 2001 by Collignon, Stefan.
  1 
 
 
Economic Policy Coordination in EMU: 
Institutional and Political Requirements 
 
 
 
By 
 
 
Stefan Collignon 
London School of Economics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paper presented at the Center for European Studies (CES) 
Harvard University 
and 
L'Institut d'Etudes Européennes de l'Université de Montréal et de l'Université McGill 
 
 
Revised version: October 2001 
 
 
 
 
 
Correspondance 
 
Stefan Collignon 
The European Institute 
The London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
Tel: 44 207 955 68 23 
S.Collignon@lse.ac.uk 
Home page: www.Stefancollignon.de   2 
Abstract 
 
This paper looks at the macroeconomic performance of EMU since it started in 1999. It 
argues that Euroland has benefited from a benign environment, appropriate monetary policy 
and structural reforms. However, there is no institution clearly in charge of formulating 
coherent economic policies in Euroland and this is reflected in the euro's external value. 
The paper then evaluates the need for policy coordination, distinguishing between weak and 
strong forms of coordination failure. It shows that intergovernmental coordination may be an 
answer to the latter, pareto-improving multiple equilibria. However, overcoming weak 
coordination failure requires further policy delegation to the EU-level, particularly for the 
definition of an aggregate fiscal policy stance. Yet, this is only possible if the democratic 
deficit resulting from intergovernmental cooperation is closed by a European-wide policy 
consensus. To achieve this should be the objective of a European constitution. 
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Stefan Collignon 
 
 
Economic Policy Coordination in EMU: Institutional and Political 
Requirements 
 
So far, European Monetary Union (EMU) has been a success. Two years after it started, the 
economy of Euroland is in better shape with economic growth at 3.5 percent in 2000, the 
highest in over a decade, unemployment down, and price stability assured. Even in 2001 it 
seems relatively robust. Although the exchange rate has depreciated from its initial high level, 
it recently seems to have found a stable range for its fluctuations. However, these are early 
days and Europe was lucky. It has not suffered from major shocks and the few minor supply 
and demand shocks that occurred are better described as 'surprises' when actual inflation and 
growth rates deviated from forecasts. Even if growth forecasts are reviewed downwards, they 
still are above average. In fact, the quality of a policy regime should be assessed over the 
entire business cycle and the emergence of new policy challenges requires continuous 
monitoring of the process and efficiency of European policy coordination (Pisani-Ferry, 
2001). The December 1999 Helsinki European Council underscored the need to press ahead 
with strengthening coordinating arrangements. Since then, national governments represented 
in the Euro group and the Commission have repeatedly attempted to make improvements in 
these procedures.
1 Many were purely technical, such as structuring the debate in the Euro 
group around lead speakers, or cosmetical, such as putting Eurogroup meetings the evening 
before the Ecofin, in order to make it more 'visible'. However, I believe the issue of policy 
coordination poses more fundamental questions regarding the economic governance of 
Euroland that need to be addressed when thinking about the EU's finality and a proper 
constitution. In this paper, I will first review the experience of EMU after 2 years. I will then 
analyse policy coordination in Euroland and finally put forward some recommendations for 
improvement. The annex gives a formal model of consensus formation. 
 
   4 
I – The economic performance of the first two years 
In the beginning, European unification was based on economic integration through customs 
union and the creation of a single market. Inevitably, this led to a single currency. Prior to the 
introduction of the Euro, the economic debate had focused on two main points: 
microeconomic benefits for the private sector operating in the single market and 
macroeconomic improvements in the management of Europe's economy. 
 
Microeconomic benefits. 
Although the creation of European Monetary Union has been an eminently political decision, 
the process to get there was to a large degree driven by private companies. A European civil 
society has helped to shape national political interests. Elected politicians would hardly have 
had the courage to delegate sovereignty over monetary policy to an independent European 
Central Bank, had they not had the support of the business community who felt the limitations 
of a single market without a single currency. When former chancellor Helmut Schmidt and 
president Giscard d'Estaing turned to leading European businessmen in 1987 asking for their 
support to create a European currency and to form the Association for the Monetary Union of 
Europe, it was out of an understanding that political decisions for further integration needed 
public support. What was sought was a European wide consensus on monetary stability.  
The theoretical foundations for such a consensus were two-fold. The first argument was based 
on 'negative integration', i.e. the elimination of barriers through the reduction of transaction 
costs (see Commission, 1990). In particular, companies in smaller countries considered the 
transaction costs of currency management related to risk hedging and transborder payments as 
a disadvantage compared to their competitors from larger countries. These transaction costs 
were estimated to amount to up to 1 percent of EU-GDP
2, but for some small countries they 
were significantly higher, reducing the potential for reaping the economics of scale that the 
single market promised. The second argument was based on regime preserving cooperation. 
With the European community agreeing on the Single Market Program, lifting all obstacles to 
the free flow of goods, services and capital between member states, it quickly became 
apparent that European economic policy suffered from inconsistencies. In an influential 
report, T. Padoa-Schioppa pointed out that "the community will be seeking to achieve the 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
1 The most recent is European Commission (2001). 
2  For a full discussion of the costs and benefits of EMU, including data, see Collignon, 1999 (a).   5 
impossible task of reconciling (1) free trade, (2) full capital mobility, (3) fixed (or at any rate 
managed) exchange rates and (4) national autonomy in the conduct of monetary policy. […] 
These four elements cannot coexist, and at least one has to give way." (1988, p.373)  Thus, 
lack of policy coordination threatened economic integration. From a business point of view, 
the appropriate way to resolve this 'inconsistent quartet' was to overcome the national 
autonomy of monetary policy by delegating it to a European institution, for eliminating any of 
the other measures would have put the single market into question. If proof was needed, it 
came in the form of the ERM-crisis in 1992-93 when distortions in the exchange rate levels 
(before and after the crisis!) did not only disturb capital markets, but also led to public protest 
against the free circulation of goods within the single market. In fact, the elimination of 
exchange risk was a necessary condition for a fully integrated, competitive market economy 
where firms compete through the quality of their products and the efficiency of production. 
Otherwise macroeconomic policy would always distort companies' level playing field in one 
way or another: exchange rate levels would bias relative prices in goods, services and labour 
markets; exchange rate volatility and divergent monetary policy would prevent the 
effectiveness of the law of one price in capital markets. Furthermore, high volatility creates a 
macroeconomic environment of uncertainty that is detrimental to investment and economic 
growth (Collignon, 1999b). 
 
Since 1999, Euroland has made good progress in overcoming these obstacles. First, the single 
market has now been complemented by a unified payment system, which has reduced 
transaction costs and established a fully integrated money market with a single interest rate. 
One area where the reduction of transaction costs still remains insufficient is the retail 
transborder payment system. While the wholesale TARGET-system, set up by the European 
System of Central Banks, is cost-efficient and competitive, ordinary customers still find that 
transborder payments for small purchases and transactions across Europe are still more 
expensive than at home. While private banks claim higher costs as being the reason for this, 
public authorities could and should do more, in order to create a level playing field in Europe. 
Experience from the USA shows that it required the creation of the Federal Reserve System 
and the harmonization of the payment system to make sure a dollar was worth a dollar all over 
the US territory. With the introduction of notes and coins, this will hopefully also become a 
reality in Europe, but national governments must follow up on the initiatives by the European 
Parliament.   6 
Secondly, by definition, EMU has eliminated all exchange risk between Euroland members. 
Thus, Euroland has effectively become a unified 'European economy' with participating 
member states as 'regional economies'. This statement needs elaboration. From a systemic 
point of view, it is money that bounds the limits of economic territory and not jurisdiction.
3 In 
a properly functioning monetary economy it is the scarcity of money that establishes the hard 
budget constraint on private and public demand for goods that are constitutive for competition 
in the market. Thus, without money, markets cannot exist. Furthermore, as Eucken (1989, p 
120-127) has pointed out, a market economy consists of many markets, which are linked and 
constrained by money. But this means that markets transacting with different currencies are 
not subject to a single constraint, as they are linked by the foreign exchange market. And this 
market establishes the trade-off ratio between different constraints. For this reason the co-
ordination of individual economic plans and actions depends on the structure of the monetary 
system that establishes the coherence of economic decisions. Therefore, in economic terms a 
‘country’ or economic territory is defined by its currency. With the creation of the single 
currency, most of the single market was put under the same budget constraint, making 
Euroland a single economic unit. However, the coexistence of a unified monetary authority 
and several autonomous national governments raises the question of the consistency between 
the views and actions of major policy makers, as we will discuss below. 
 
The macroeconomic management of Euroland 
"In all beginnings there is magic" said Hermann Hesse. Indeed, the macroeconomic 
performance during the first two years of EMU has been surprisingly good. While Europe 
suffered from high inflation, low growth, rising unemployment and public deficits in the 
1980's and 90's, we now witness the opposite. For an assessment of EMU, price stability is the 
key.
4 Although consumer price inflation measured by the HIPC-index, stayed within the 
ECB's target range of 0 to 2 percent during 1999, it started to overshoot in June 2000 and has 
stabilized in the 2-3 percent range since then. However, the ECB's inflation target has been 
achieved by the core inflation rate, which excludes energy and unprocessed food costs, and 
the GDP-deflator has increased by less than 1.7 percent in every quarter since EMU started. 
Probably more important is the management of inflation expectations – a crucial element in 
                                                             
3 Except, of course, for the fact that the territory of money is determined by the jurisdiction of legal tender. 
4 In Collignon 1999a, I have argued that price stability is a sufficient economic condition to make EMU 
sustainable.   7 
the ECB’s strategy.
5 Figure 1 shows the expectations of future inflation, derived from the 
French indexed government bond (OATi) and the ECB's policy instruments. It appears that in 
early 1999, EMU was heading toward deflation, but this changed rapidly after the ECB 
lowered interest rates. Subsequently, inflation expectations by financial markets stabilized 
below 2 percent. The tightness of monetary policy can be measured by the ECB real rate. 
Usually, economic theory takes the real short-term interest rate as the critical monetary policy 
variable and calculates it as nominal minus current inflation rate. However, current inflation is 
determined by past policy. It may therefore be more significant to deflate short nominal rates 
by long-term inflation expectations as in figure 1. Between April 99 and March 2000, 
monetary policy seems to have been accommodative and stimulating profits and growth. This 
would also explain why the real return on OATi's increased during this period. Monetary 
policy moved into a more restrictive range in November 2000 when the HCPI-inflation 
reached its peak. Interestingly from that moment on, inflation expectations started to fall 
significantly below the 2% range. These developments show that the ECB has been very 
successful in maintaining the credibility of its commitment to price stability. The degree of 
euro-price stability reflected in these indicators contrasts favourably with the USA, where 
inflation fluctuated in a 2-4 percent range. It also documents the advantages of a unified 
monetary policy in periods of economic shocks: while in the 1970's after the demise of 
Bretton Woods and the oil shocks flexible exchange rates led to widely diverging policy 
responses in Europe, this time monetary policy was, by definition, coherent and aimed at 
preserving price stability. 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
5 See: ECB Monthly Bulletin, May 2000   8 
 
The highest European growth in over a decade is a direct consequence of EMU. This is not 
only because the elimination of all exchange risk in the single market and the establishment of 
a monetary framework of stability was in itself an important structural reform that improved 
conditions for investment, but also because it changed the conduct of economic policy in the 
EU. The reasons for Europe's growth-slowdown and high unemployment in the 1980s and 
'90s have been subject to heated debates. Conservative orthodoxy claims that it is all due to 
Europe's high regulations, rigid labour market, an out-dated welfare system and an over-
dimensioned public sector – in short, it is all about supply side economics. For them, EMU 
was supposed to be a vehicle to impose the 'necessary structural reforms' on an unwilling 
population and polity. However, a closer look shows that these ideas do not always coincide 
with the facts
6: The costs of regulation are not as high as they appear and the structure of 
unemployment, the patterns of worker and job turnover and the behaviour of wages in Europe 
is not so different from the USA as has often been assumed. It has also been noticed that 
Europe's supply side structures have not changed significantly between periods of high and 
low growth and if there has been change, it went in the ‘wrong’ direction (Blanchard, 2000). 
Recent studies even find "the absence of a truly European employment problem" (von Hagen 
and Mundschenk, 2001) because labour market structures and performances are too 
                                                             
6 See for example: Alogoskoufis et al., 1995 
Figure 1: Inflation Expectation derived from OATi
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diversified to find a unifying explanation. However, aggregate unemployment continues to be 
high and this is a problem. 
The alternative explanation emphasized insufficient demand and the suboptional policy mix in 
the 1980's and 90's. Monetary policy was seen as the prominent culprit (Modigliani, 1997). 
Macroeconomic management must have had an important role in explaining why Europe's 
performance lagged behind the United States. This is evident when looking at output gaps. 
While the distribution of years with positive and negative output gaps was fairly balanced in 
the USA and Portugal, where unemployment always stayed low, it dramatically deteriorated 
in Europe during the 1980s and 90's (see table 1). 
 
Table 1: Ratio of Number of Years with Positive to Negative Output Gaps 
  1960-81 1982-99 
EU 15  5.0 0.29 
Germany  2.0 0.20 
France  1.0 0.50 
Netherlands  2.0 0.50 
Belgium  1.3 0.29 
Spain  1.4 0.38 
Portugal 
USA 
0.8 
1.0 
1.00 
1.00 
Source: European Commission, AMECO; OECD. 
 
Thus, an important difference in the macroeconomic management between Europe and 
America consists in the degree to which the output potential is actually realised. Economic 
theory readily recognises the crucial role of monetary policy in this context. This seems to be 
confirmed by the European experience, where monetary policy arrangements suffered from a 
double asymmetry: first, within the European Monetary system, the Bundesbank was the 
dominant authority and this implied higher interest rates for most other ERM-countries. 
Secondly, Frankfurt's monetary policy was overly restrictive, even for German consumption. 
Figures 2a and 2b show that the Bundesbank contrary to the American Fed frequently kept 
interest rates higher than output considerations under the Taylor-rule would have suggested. 
This overtightness-bias explains a good part of the excessive accumulation of negative output 
gaps.
7 Fiscal policy seems to have had a more secondary and dependent role. (See Collignon 
and Mundschenk, 1999). 
   10
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
7 On the asymmetric behaviour of the Bundesbank see also Clarida, R. and M. Gertler (1997). 
Figure 2a : Taylor rule and Bundesbank
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Figure 2b : Output gap and deviation from Taylor rule
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However, the restrictive monetary bias intensified Europe's budgetary pressures. Higher 
interest rates and lower growth increased the tax burden of debt service and required extra 
fiscal consolidation in order to keep public debt sustainable. These macroeconomic problems 
could not have been solved by structural reforms. They would have implied a need to lower 
output to the insufficient demand level, while supply side reforms are aimed at improving the 
output potential. Hence the dominant Tietmeyer/Waigel policy mix (tight money, tight fiscal) 
re-enforced both the aggregate demand and supply problems in Europe.  
 
Real change only came about when the ECB lowered interest rates in April 1999. Economic 
growth then resumed, closing output gaps and creating new jobs all over Europe. Incidentally, 
it also supported growth in the non-Euro member states. Subsequent interest rate hikes by the 
ECB remained in the neutral range, at least until the end of 2000. Figure 1 shows that the 
OATi real bond yield and the nominal yield started to fall when the ECB's real short rate 
exceeded 3 percent, i.e. when the monetary policy stance became restrictive.
8 Hence both, 
inflation and growth expectations must have fallen after November, although growth is still 
expected to be higher than in early 1999. The monetary policy stance in Euroland also 
improved the macroeconomic environment for fiscal consolidation. Targets set in the Stability 
and Growth Pact were overfulfilled for the Euro-area as a whole and only minor slippages 
occurred in Finland (1999: -0.8 percent points), France (-0.1 in 200), Italy and Portugal (-0.2 
in 2000) (see Pisani-Ferry, 2001). Dominique Strauss-Kahn, who was a leading voice in the 
intimate Euro-group of Finance Ministers, characterised the new combination of monetary 
and fiscal policy as the 'Clinton-Greenspan mix', which he contrasted with the 'Reagan-
Volcker mix' of the 1980's. It implied a relatively accommodating monetary policy stance 
with strict control of public expenditure (rather than deficits). Low interest rates would then 
lead to a virtuous circle of renewed growth, extra revenue, and therefore shrinking public 
deficits. 
 
However, in order to ensure the long-term sustainability of this positive policy orientation, a 
third element had to be integrated into the policy mix: wage developments. The reason is that 
                                                             
8 This conclusion can be reached from the Taylor rule of setting interest rates with respect to inflation and output 
gap or from the Ramsey rule of comparing real interest and growth rates.   12
the relatively accommodating monetary policy stance is dependent on price stability. But this 
requires that the price level be grounded on a nominal variable other than money supply. 
Given that wage contracts are set in nominal terms, the strategic variable for monetary policy 
must be unit labour costs. Unit labour costs are stabilised when nominal wage cost increases 
do not exceed aggregate labour productivity improvements.
9 Hence, wage bargaining had to 
be taken in consideration when defining an optimal policy mix in Euroland. The new German 
government that came into office at the end of 1998 quickly adopted this philosophy.
10 Under 
the German EU presidency it introduced the Macroeconomic Dialogue at the Cologne summit 
as an instrument to integrate Europe's social partners' views into the procedures of policy 
coordination. It institutionalised a twice-yearly informal process of consultations between 
public authorities and representatives of wage bargainers without setting constraining 
objectives. The dialogue discusses technical macroeconomic issues on a national level and 
reports them subsequently for a political exchange between Council, Commission, ECB and 
European Trade Unions and employers. The Macroeconomic Dialogue is a rather weak form 
of policy coordination. Some observers have criticized that such instrument of coordination 
cannot ensure the enforcement of any agreement on guidelines (von Hagen and Mundschenk, 
2001) or that 'social partners' do not set wages in all EU countries (Pisani-Ferry, 2001). 
However, these objections underestimate the role of communicative action in the formulation 
of policy consensus (see annex). The underlying philosophy of the Macroeconomic Dialogue 
is to structure a debate in Europe where relevant policy information could be shared in a 
consensus building way. So far, the experience has been positive, as most partners who have 
participated would agree. 
 
The improved demand management allowed the Portuguese EU-presidency, in spring 2000, to 
put forward an ambitious program of structural supply side reforms, creating a 'European New 
Economy'. This so-called Lisbon-Strategy gave new zest and direction to the structural reform 
processes, which were previously agreed in Cardiff (completing the single market for 
products and capital) and Luxembourg (improving the quality and flexibility of Europe's 
labour force). Only in the future will the effects of this modernisation policy become 
manifest. 
 
                                                             
9 See Collignon, 1999(c) and (d) for the underlying theory. 
10 See Jahreswirtschaftsbericht (Economic Report) der Bundesregierung for 1999 and 2000.   13
The exchange rate puzzle 
 
To summarize, a lot of change has taken place in Europe. The open question is: are these 
changes sustainable? Financial markets do not seem to be convinced. In foreign exchange 
markets, the euro has been weak from the beginning (see figure 3). In view of all the positive 
changes this fact remains puzzling. However, I believe, one has to distinguish between 
conjunctural, structural and psychological explanations. First, on the side of more transitory 
factors, most analysts agree that the US-dollar's strength relative to the euro was largely due 
to the extremely buoyant perspectives of the US economy. The longest boom in US history 
had created many attractive opportunities for investment. As a consequence, the importance 
of US-dollar assets (US treasury securities, corporate bonds, equities, foreign exchange 
markets, derivatives) has increased in all market segments over recent years (IMF 2000). This 
did not necessarily reflect distrust in the euro. In fact, prior to the EMU-start in 1999, many 
international fund managers had taken large positions in euro-denominated paper and this 
explains why the euro temporarily appreciated. Only very few investment funds have 
subsequently shifted their portfolio in a significant way back into dollar assets, despite the 
Euro-depreciation. Especially Asian fund managers seem to expect that the euro will 
appreciate in the long run and therefore they do not wish to realize losses today. This is a sign 
of confidence, although it may also imply that they will liquidate some euro assets when the 
euro recovers, and therefore recovery could be slow. 
On the other had, new investment does seem to carry a higher return in the US. This has been 
quite obvious for the stock exchanges, but also in the bond market. Nominal yield 
differentials favoured the dollar, at least in the short and medium term. This is clear from 
figure 3. It is striking that the apparent euro-weakness is simply continuing the previous DM-
trend, which has depreciated since 1995 exactly when the nominal bond yield differential 
turned against Europe. Frankel (1995, p.114) has pointed out that structural models based on 
interest differentials appear to work well in some periods, but not in others. It seems that the 
persistent negative interest differential since mid-95 has had a major impact on first the DM 
and now the euro. This must have encouraged outflows of new capital from Europe into dollar 
assets. Yet, Frankel's model used real government bond differentials. This is the correct 
approach when markets are taking economic fundamentals into account. But figure 3 shows 
that at the end of 1998, nominal and real bond differential went into opposite directions. The 
low inflation rates in Euroland turned the real yield differential in favour of Euro-bonds, but   14
the dollar continued to appreciate. This implies that financial markets ignored the loss of 
competitiveness of the US-economy which will require a depreciation of the dollar. Such 
behaviour is rational in a bubble economy. We may therefore conclude that the US-economy 
entered its bubble dynamic precisely at the time when the euro was introduced.
11 But when 
the bubble will finally burst, the euro is likely to appreciate again. Hence, the transitory 
factors in the exchange rate are mainly about dollar strength. 
 
 
 
 
Second, on the structural side, we find capital flows related to German difficulties to cope 
with unification as an explanation for euro weakness. The persistently high cost of German 
unification, with the related tax burden, led to a net outflows of foreign direct investment not 
only from Germany, but also the Euro area. The persistent volume of DM 200bn (Euro 
100bn) gross transfers
12 p.a. into East Germany (6 percent of GDP) must imply significant 
                                                             
11 In fact, the beginning of the bubble seems to coincide with the interest cuts by the FED in October and 
November 1998, that were meant to reassure markets after the LTCM crisis. 
12 Net transfers amounted to DM 150bn, which is the more frequently quoted figure. However, with respect to 
the burden of unification on the productive economy and the distortions it has caused, gross transfers seem more 
Figure 3: DM/USD Exchange Rate and Bond Differentials
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distortions in the return on the German capital stock. Here are some facts: in 1998, East 
German GDP was DM 436bn, but absorption was DM 655bn or 50 percent more. Excess 
absorption in the new states was mostly financed by public transfers, only one third by private 
capital flows. The share of labour cost in total value added was roughly two thirds in the West 
and over 95 percent in the East. Thus, the aggregate German profit share fell by nearly 4 
percentage points. Gross transfers amounted to 21 percent of West German profits, therefore 
reducing Western profit margins after transfers by nearly 7 percentage points. At a capital-
output ratio of 3.7, this implies a reduction in the post (gross) transfer return on the West 
German capital stock of 190 basis points from 9.0 to 7.1 percent. In terms of net transfers, the 
reduction of the profit share is by 15.5 percent and the return on capital by 140 base points. 
By contrast, the return on capital before transfers would have been 1.1 percent in the East and 
13.5  (respectively net 10.4) percent after transfers (assuming the same capital-output ratio).
13 
While these transfers were financed at first by public sector borrowing, they became an 
onerous charge when the government embarked on fiscal consolidation in 1995/6. These 
distortions must have led to a significant reallocation of West German capital – but in a 
globalized economy not necessarily in favour of East Germany.
14  Given this background, the 
evolution of the Euro exchange rate appears somewhat less surprising, although few observers 
had anticipated it. 
 
The third aspect concerns the uncertainties and the psychological effects resulting from the 
lack of transparency in economic policymaking. Jacquet and Pisany-Ferry and (2001) have 
discussed the weaknesses in the present arrangements for a coherent exchange rate policy. 
Together with many analysts, they claim that "a currency can be weak because market 
participants consider that there is no convincing economic strategy." (p.23). However, this is 
not only a question of exchange rate management. It goes to the heart of EMU. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
relevant. For example Sinn (2000) shows that the cost of capital in East Germany became negative because of 
tax incentives. 
13 I have used figures from Sinn (2000), DIW and Bundesministerium der Finanzen for these calculations. 
14 The burden of unification transfers may also explain why the German economy did not respond with the same 
vigor to the interest rate cuts by the ECB in 1999 as other Euroland economies.   16
II. Policy coordination in Euroland 
 
 
Europe has a myriad of amazing processes, strategies and devices for policy coordination. But 
there is no institution clearly in charge of formulating coherent economic policies in 
Euroland. In this section, I will first explain why this may be a problem, and then look at the 
existing methods and instruments for policy coordination and their shortcomings. 
 
The need for policy coordination 
 
Europe's jungle of policy processes (see figure 4) is a consequence of the Monnet-method of 
integration: create structures to make people cooperate and focus on what is feasible. With 
EMU, a single budget constraint was established for an integrated market economy, but many 
other functions of economic policy remain the domain of separate national and regional 
jurisdictions. When policy outcomes are rival and excludable between jurisdictions, the 
market mechanism will provide efficient solutions and policy decisions can be made 
independently of others. This is, for example, the case of public debt where the no-bail-out 
clause establishes excludability.  By definition, independent national decisions are non-
cooperative. If the government's policy choices in one country were completely irrelevant for 
all others, the notion of policy coordination would be redundant. But in a single market with a 
single currency the range for efficient independent policy decisions is reduced and the scope 
for both positive and negative externalities significantly enlarged. As is well known from 
economic theory, one cannot expect that purely independent decisions will necessarily result 
in the efficient provision of collective goods. The divergence between individually and 
collectively desired outcomes is frequently attributed to coordination failure. 
 
If policy outcomes depend on common shared variables, no one who is operating in the euro-
zone can be excluded from the benefits (or losses) that are derived from these variables. 
Hence, they can be viewed as public or collective goods. The supply of theses goods can be 
joint, i.e. making them available to one member of the group means that they can easily be 
supplied to others as well; therefore, jointness of supply of a collective good relates to the 
degree of cooperation between those who provide it. Alternatively, collective goods are non-
joint, meaning that the supply of a given collective good requires the participation of all who   17
will enjoy its benefits. Olson (1971, p. 36-43) has called the former inclusive collective good 
and the latter exclusive. The reason is that jointness in supply implies that an increase in the 
number and size of members will increase the benefits to all, so that the group is open to all. 
Benassi et al. (1994) call this a case of strategic complementarity, when the objectives of all 
other players induce a change in the same direction by any individual agent, because the 
typical individual actor is better off when aggregate output is higher.
15 Strategic 
complementarity is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for multiple equilibria and, 
therefore, for the possibility of strong form coordination failure. This occurs whenever the 
system is characterised by multiple, Pareto-rankable Nash equilibria. It is then possible to 
improve policy outcomes and stabilize the situation without necessarily realizing all the 
possible benefits from integration.  
In the other case, when there is no jointness in supply, non-participation of one member in the 
provision of the public good could deprive all others of the benefits of this specific policy 
variable; hence members will wish to control access to the group and we have exclusive 
collective goods. If excludability in the provision of public goods is possible and externalities 
occur as well, there are strategic substitutabilities between the pay-offs occurring to different 
players. This leads to weak form coordination failure, i.e. the structure of policy making is 
such that the effects of national non-cooperative policy outcomes are inferior to cooperative 
ones and the supply of the collective goods is suboptimal. Situations with strategic 
substitutabilities have only one equilibrium and can therefore lead to weak form but never to 
strong form coordination failure. In this case, a unique low welfare Nash equilibrium is the 
solution of the 'race to the bottom'. 
 
The distinction between weak and strong form coordination failure corresponds to the nature 
of externalities in collective goods (Benassi et al., 1994). While significant externalities exist 
in both cases, the methods of internalising them become absolutely crucial for the provision of 
exclusive collective goods and therefore for the performance (and ultimately the 
sustainability)
16 of EMU. Olson (p.39) has emphasised that 'whether a group behaves 
exclusively or inclusively, ... depends on the nature of the objective the group seeks, not on 
any characteristic of membership'. Therefore, different policy objectives require different 
                                                             
15 Note, however, that the issues of the existence of multiple equilibria and their welfare properties are logically 
distinct. See Romer, 1996, p. 296. 
16 See also Collignon, 1999 a.   18
forms of cooperative behaviour in order to provide the relevant collective goods. The need for 
policy coordination in Euroland is derived from these objectives. With the advent of EMU, 
the scope of shared variables and possible externalities has increased substantially. Numerous 
macro-economic objectives have now effectively become collective goods, i.e. their reality is 
felt by all who participate in the single currency: price stability, the level of interest rates, the 
external value of the currency, economic growth, employment, external balance. Von Hagen 
and Mundschenk (2001) call these variables club goods meaning they are shared by all 
members of a 'club' (the euro-zone), where access is limited. Although club theory has many 
fascinating implications for regional integration, that still need to be explored further, their 
central argument is that the nature of public goods shared in the euro-zone requires new 
approaches to macroeconomic management.
17 In order to overcome policy coordination 
failures and to improve the outcome, both on a national and an aggregate level, ex-ante policy 
coordination is required (Benassi et al. 1994, chap. 9).  
 
Coordination failure implies the absence of binding agreements, i.e. lack of consensus. In 
cooperating games people negotiate about the future course of action and the negotiation 
culminates in the signing of binding agreements. What matters in these games is the 
preference structure of agents since it is this structure that determines what contracts are 
feasible (Binmore 1998, p.38). If there is a parallelism of interests, cooperation is not only 
desirable but will also lead to binding agreements. Alternatively, an opposition of interests 
implies disjunct preferences and non-cooperation. In the formation of collective preferences 
the processing of information is crucial for the emergence of consensus. In the annex, I have 
given a formal model of how disjunct preferences can be aggregated into collective 
consensual preferences. It turns out that consensual decision-making can be described as a 
stochastic process where the institutional structures of communicative action determine the 
emergence of an equilibrium (i.e. consensus) and the speed of adjustment. Dissensus is 
described by the deviation from the consensual equilibrium vector and conflict means the 
absence of equilibrium. This model of consensus is relevant for our analysis because the 
fundamental distinction between strong and weak form policy coordination failure lies in the 
institutional structure by which the exchange of information affects policy objectives (i.e. 
political interests).   
                                                             
17 One should also remember that public goods require a ‘public’ that debates and decides on their production 
and allocation. See annex.   19
 
There are two different forms of coordination, which are reflected in the two main methods of 
European integration: 
1. The first method is intergovernmental cooperation. In a symmetric strategic framework, 
strong form coordination failure (multiple equilibria) can be eliminated by simple reciprocal 
information. Examples are the informal discussions in the euro-group or the Macroeconomic 
Dialogue. Governments will then still act independently, but may be led to choose at least an 
improved non-cooperative solution. However, not all equilibria are symmetric. 
Harmonisation through formal rules and regulations is required when informational 
asymmetries are dominant. Typically, this applies to many issues related to the creation of a 
single market. In fiscal policy, the no-bail-out rule and the Stability and Growth Pact provide 
constraints on national policies that tend to limit the damage from informational 
asymmetries. More recently, the 'open method of coordination' emphasised at the Lisbon 
Summit in 2000 has added coordination by competition for best practices and benchmarking. 
This method stands half way between informal exchange of information and formal 
regulation. Many of its practices fall into the domain of the subsidiarity principle where 
governments seek to maintain national autonomy on grounds of democratic accountability 
and efficiency.  However, the subsidiarity principle effectively states that not all member-
states wish to make the same effort to provide public goods. Because of its low degree of 
commitment, intergovernmental policy coordination is only suitable for inclusive collective 
goods, where the benefits to each member increase with the number of cooperating partners. 
Even if these methods tend to Pareto-improve the selection of non-cooperative equilibria, 
they are not sufficient to eliminate weak form coordination failure.  
2. To overcome weak-form coordination failure is more difficult. It requires external 
constraints to national policies, i.e. binding decision-making rules.  These can be obtained by 
delegation of specific policy-making functions to common institutions. Others have called 
this delegation a pooling of sovereignties where regional networks fulfil certain functions that 
states can no longer perform on their own (Smith, 1995). Delegation implies a single, unified 
decision-making rule and would therefore always produce a coherent policy response. If the 
decisions are consensual, they are also binding. Hence, delegation is the appropriate 
instrument to overcome weak coordination failure, because it prevents defection in the 
provision of collective goods. Of course, there is no guarantee that a common institution 
could never make mistakes; but given the economic structure and the unified policy   20
objectives, the condition-set for policy optima is unambiguous: delegation solves coordination 
failure by internalising externalities. Examples are the Common Agricultural Policy, 
competition and trade policy and monetary policy. 
 
Each of these approaches has its strength and weaknesses. The essential question is how the 
effects of externalities are appropriated or internalised. If European integration produces 
inclusive collective goods, intergovernmental coordination is appropriate. However, in all 
areas where common policy objectives create exclusive collective goods, delegation of 
decision-making to the European level is required.  
To sum up, the logic of the European debate on policy coordination is as follows: those who 
deny the need for coordination implicitly assume that national policies are completely 
irrelevant for others. There are no positive or negative externalities and national policies can 
be treated like private goods. Yet, with the start of EMU, this proposition finds only a very 
limited range of applicability. The creation of a club also creates new collective goods. If 
externalities exist, policy coordination can Pareto-improve welfare. Those who promote 
intergovernmental policy coordination implicitly focus on the elimination of strong form 
coordination failure. They wish to choose Nash equilibria in government non-cooperation that 
yield higher welfare effects. But they do not solve the problem of policy externalities itself, 
i.e. they do not overcome weak form coordination failure. The solution to this problem is the 
delegation of policy making to a common European institution. This raises the question 
whether the instruments of European policy coordination are suited to their tasks. 
 
The instruments of European policy coordination 
Figure 4 shows the interrelations between different policy actors and coordination processes. 
The ECB sets the parameters of monetary policy as a fully integrated, federal body. Ecofin, 
the council of finance ministers, sets the economic agenda for the European Union as a whole 
and is the legislative body for harmonisation legislative and regulatory provisions. Ecofin also 
decides on the structural reforms under the Cardiff and Luxembourg processes and facilitates 
the Macroeconomic Dialogue with the social partners. The Euro-group, as a subset, entertains 
a privileged dialogue with the ECB that permits the reciprocal exchange of information. All 
these actors and processes contribute to the definition of an optimal policy mix for Euroland:   21
structural reforms determine the economic growth potential, the interplay of monetary and 
fiscal policy must guarantee that it is realised in the context of price stability. 
 
The Treaty establishes the Broad Economic Guidelines (BEG) as the central coordination 
instrument (art. 99). Their purpose is to ensure that member states consider their economic 
policies as 'a matter of common concern' and shall conduct them 'with the view of 
contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Community'. Thus, the BEG aim at 
the provision of inclusive collective goods. However, their efficiency remains doubtful. In 
reality, the EU produces an indigestible policy document where hordes of bureaucrats from 
national finance ministries re-write the original draft made by the European Commission. 
Their prime task is not to define common objectives, but to prune it of all aspects that could 
constrain their national governments. Thus, the BEG can hardly be called an external 
constraint that could overcome weak coordination failure. Occasionally, monitoring of the 
BEG receives public attention, like the recent discussion on Ireland's policy mix or the budget 
position of Italy in 1999. In most cases the public's perception is at significant variance from 
the internal debates among government officials on the subject, but the exchange between 
policy makers may Pareto-improve strong coordination failure.  
Another form of information exchange takes place in the Euro-group, the regular meeting of 
finance ministers with the ECB president and the commissioner. Due to its informal character, 
the small number of participants, and the confidential nature of the debates, this forum has 
helped to speed up the formation of common views between the participating ministers and 
also the ECB. Discussions are very frank, often with a lead speaker and a discussant. The 
European Commission usually prepares policy-relevant analysis and the quality of these 
papers has greatly improved over the last two years. The brightest and best-trained ministers 
often dominate the debate. The dreary reading of prepared speaking notes is less common in 
the Euro-group than in Ecofin meetings where ministers speak under the scrutinising eyes of 
their top civil servants. 
Unfortunately, due to its informal nature, the emerging political consensus within the Euro-
group lacks commitment. Thus, when the French finance minister Ch. Sauter wanted to use 
windfall revenue from economic growth ('cagnotte') in order to pay back public debt, he was 
overruled by his Prime Minister. When the German government announced a major tax 
reform in 2000, it did not even brief its partners in advance – not to mention taking any advice 
about its appropriateness in terms of the aggregate policy mix. The French EU presidency in   22
2000 declared better policy coordination as its objective and then decided to lower petrol tax 
three days before the informal Ecofin meeting at Versailles – contradicting the wishes voiced 
at previous consultations. And a cacophony of diverging ministerial statements on interest and 
exchange rates is the rule in Euroland, while unanimity and disciplined communication are – 
not surprisingly – the exception. Hence, in the last resort fiscal policy in Euroland is still 
guided by the principle 'chacun pour soi' and not by 'common concern' as postulated by the 
Treaty. Although coordination failure in fiscal policy is of the strong form, the simple 
exchange of information is not sufficient to move to Pareto-improved policy mix equilibria – 
and certainly not to ensure optimal welfare states. What is missing is binding agreements on 
the aggregate fiscal policy stance. Below I will argue that this flaw is due to the institutional 
set-up of legitimating policy choices in Europe. 
 
The EU-Treaty establishes price stability as the most important collective good of EMU and it 
assigns the pursuit of this objective to the European Central Bank. Political autonomy or 
independence of the European Central Bank is seen as a necessary condition to ensure that the 
budget constraint remains ‘hard’. Implicitly this stipulation assumes that an independent 
central bank could ultimately always provide price stability. Therefore price stability is an 
inclusive public good, which could also benefit from the policy contributions of other actors. 
Yet, given that a hard budget constraint is the foundation of any monetary economy, the 
central bank’s autonomy, i.e. its constitutional foundation, can never be an issue for policy 
coordination. But under certain conditions the bank's behaviour may fit into a cooperative 
game, because even if central bank independence is a necessary condition for efficient 
stabilisation policies, it is not sufficient. Monetary policy also has consequences for 
investment, growth, public finance, external balance etc. It is not taking place in isolation. 
Hence, the policy outcomes resulting from some actors’ choices may depend directly on 
policy choices made by the central bank and inversely. The inclusive collective good 
character of price stability could cause strong form coordination failure. Coordinating 
behaviour between independent actors through informal exchange of information as in the 
euro-group or the Macroeconomic Dialogue may then produce superior outcomes compared 
to non-cooperation.  
 
Policy coordination between governments may be of a different nature. I have argued that if 
government action in one country affects the utility of citizens in another country, policy   23
outcomes become a collective good and require some form of collective governance. The 
opposite view states that multiple government policies are a desirable feature because with 
heterogeneous economic structures and one single monetary policy for all, greater flexibility 
is required to adjust to asymmetric shocks. Assuming that mobility in labour markets is 
limited, it is often heard that different fiscal policy responses may provide the flexibility 
needed to deal with cyclical divergence among member states.
18 Most of these arguments 
have a jurisdiction bias.  People 'think in Nations' because they have been around for so 
long.
19 Nations are based on territory and 'political territory' reflects the spatial extend of state 
power, i.e. the capacity to impose the collective rules and regulations. Yet, as we saw above, 
'economic territory' is defined by money. Although there is some collective regulation in 
Europe, it is also clear that the degrees of integration in the economic and the political sphere 
are unbalanced and this fact can cause coordination failures. For example, the jurisdiction bias 
frequently leads to the assumption that idiosyncratic economic shocks are national and 
therefore need national responses. But this is not necessarily the case, as the BSE-crisis 
shows. Shocks can be regional or sectorial and border transcending. The appropriate reaction 
to a single and unique border-transcending shock is a single unified policy response and not 
divergent policies in different jurisdictions. In fact, the need to find remedies for undesired 
developments at the national level may be more often the consequence of previous policy 
mistakes made at that level. Some consider that non-coordination and competition among 
national policies is best because a portfolio of national mistakes reduces the risk of major 
damage (Vaubel, 1983). But surely it must be better to avoid mistakes altogether. Hence the 
significant focus on prudential constraints in European policy-making – which is one form of 
coordination. The desire to avoid moral hazard and free riding has been a driving force behind 
the European philosophy of 'no bail-outs' and the insistence on national policy responsibility. 
But this approach is limited to policy areas where externalities and spillover effects are small. 
If collective goods are exclusive, the assignment of policy responsibility to national 
jurisdictions becomes dysfunctional. 
 
This concerns particularly the case of defining an optimal policy stance for the Eurozone. We 
may call an efficient policy mix any combination of fiscal and monetary policy that yields 
                                                             
18 It is, however, often overlooked that flexibility in capital movements has greatly increased with EMU. For 
example, Portugal's current account deficit presently stands at 15 percent of GDP – clearly an unsustainable 
situation if Portugal had its own currency, but perfectly normal with a single currency. 
19 Smith (1995, p.62) makes the point very clearly.   24
price stability and full employment. Which combination is chosen depends on institutional 
constraints and collective preferences (see annex). If the realised outcome reflects collective 
preferences, it is called optimal.
20 While price stability is an inclusive public good, the 
definition of an aggregate fiscal stance is exclusive. The defection of only one fiscal actor 
from a previously agreed aggregate policy stance would prevent the provision of this 
collective good and require policy adjustments by the ECB and possibly other economic 
actors. Hence, the non-jointness of supply in the aggregate fiscal policy stance leads to weak 
form coordination failure.  
 
The rationale for maintaining autonomy in budget decisions is, of course, derived from the 
fact that the allocation function of fiscal policy can usually be assigned rather clearly to 
jurisdictional responsibilities. Thus, Jacquet and Pisani-Ferry claim that the introduction of 
the euro requires closer intergovernmentalism because 'a common economic policy can only 
emerge on the basis of coordinated action between independent actors, some of which (the 
ECB) are federal institutions and others (the governments) are not.' (2001, p.10) However, 
one has to distinguish between different government functions. Structural economic policies 
or allocative functions of fiscal policies can often be reduced to a regional level. Hence, for 
these functions intergovernmental cooperation is appropriate. But for essential variables of a 
monetary economy (such as interest and exchange rates) this is not the case. Macroeconomic 
externalities are the reason why fiscal federalism has always assigned the stabilisation 
function of budget policies to a central (federal) government agency. Yet, in EMU they are 
subject to an intergovernmental regime. Stabilisation policy in Euroland gives rise to a two-
dimensional assignment problem. One is related to the fact that the European Central Bank 
targets union-wide aggregates, but there is no fiscal authority that determines the aggregate 
fiscal policy stance in relation to monetary policy. When fiscal authorities fail to internalise 
the area-wide effects of their policies, coordination failure is the result (Gatti and van 
Wijnbergen, 2000). In principle, alternative combinations of levying taxes, borrowing in 
interest-bearing form and printing high-powered money can finance government expenditure. 
All these methods have consequences for prices, interest rates, economic growth and 
exchange rates, i.e. the policy mix. Hence, a non-cooperative setting of national budgets is 
                                                             
20 Most of the macroeconomic literature is about how to deal with shocks that cause temporary deviations from 
such efficient policy mix. I will not deal with such adjustment dynamics but focus instead on the choice of an 
optimal policy mix that reflects long term collective preferences.   25
unlikely to yield a coherent aggregate fiscal policy stance and makes the achievement of an 
optimal policy mix fortuitous, at best. The other dimension concerns cyclical divergence 
between member States. If markets are not fully integrated and regional booms led to regional 
price developments that affect the average price level in the union, then fiscal policy could 
assume a dampening effect at least for prices of non-tradable regional goods. Under these 
circumstances fiscal policy must be regionally differentiated. Such considerations have 
recently influenced the EU's assessment of the Irish policy stance. However, one should be 
sceptical how far the regional stabilisation function is a feasible policy option (Pisani-Ferry, 
2001). In fact, market logic would suggest that under a given budget constraint a local boom 
kills itself via the loss of competitiveness. This could be a long and painful learning process; 
but unless the local shock has an emergency character (like earthquakes, BSE or foot-and-
mouth disease), it might be more easily dealt with by income policies than by differentiated 
fiscal policies.  
 
The need for coordination of national fiscal policies and euro-zone monetary policy arises 
from the need for a clearly defined aggregate policy stance and the potential costs of 
uncertainty regarding the direction of the policy mix in Euroland if such stance is not defined 
(Jacquet and Pisani-Ferry, 2001). In unitary democratic states, this dilemma is typically 
solved by a central budget that reflects (more or less) the collective preferences of voters. In 
federal states, only central authorities are in a position to internalise the externalities of 
regional policies. Different allocative functions are assigned to different jurisdictions and a 
redistributive mechanism (such as Länderfinanzausgleich in Germany) ensures the coherence 
of collective choices at different government levels with the overall budget constraint. In 
Euroland, this is not the case. The Stability and Growth Pact is a device to overcome free 
riding, but it gives no guidance about the coherent policy mix (Collignon 1996). There is a 
major gap in Europe's institutional set-up. The present arrangements are a bricolage of odds 
and ends; they do not ensure a coherent and sustainable optimal policy mix. In the next 
section, I will propose ideas how to overcome these shortcomings. 
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Figure 4: Policy Coordination in Euroland 
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III. The next step in building Europe 
 
The need to improve economic policy co-ordination has been apparent for a long time. The 
former president of the Bundesbank H. Tietmeyer frequently emphasised the need for 
complementing monetary union by political union. Yet, when the French government called 
for a gouvernement économique, their German friends were quick to reject it, instead of using 
the proposal as a stepping-stone for their own declared objective. This may be due to the 
clumsiness of neo-wilhelminian diplomacy, but more fundamentally it reflects a profound 
resistance to see government power restricted and to surrender areas of national sovereignty. 
However, the dissensus between governments reflects a deeper disagreement between people. 
In terms of the consensus model in the annex, the chain of respect between individuals across 
national boundaries is still weak. Distrust, i.e. zero weight to another's argument, is still 
rampant despite 50 years of integration. As a consequence, dissensus on European policy 
options is significantly higher between countries than within them. What Europe now needs, 
if it wants to sustain its integration, is a proper policy consensus, shared by all citizens, and 
institutions that allow to create it. 
 
The need for a European consensus 
 
The reasons for the persistent European policy dissensus are grounded in the institutional 
arrangements of decision-making. In modern democracies, policy consensus arises from 
democratic debate, exchange of arguments and communicative action (Habermas, 1984; 
1987). People evaluate  potential outcomes of choices on the basis (background) of their 
theories of the world (Buchanan, 1991, p.52). Through dialogue, people seek to convince 
each other of the 'truth' of their advanced positions and the validity of rules and norms of 
action. Thus, disagreement over policies can reflect either genuine differences in interests (i.e. 
evaluative choices) or differences in theories (i.e. the analysis of the world and the prediction 
of outcomes). Conflicts of interests need to be solved by negotiation and compromise (finding 
terms that are acceptable to everybody); conflicts resulting from different views about the 
world require consensus on theory and analysis (Buchanan, 1991, p.61) In this perspective, 
democratic votes are a device to create procedural agreement on choice outcomes when 
further consensus fails. Electoral campaigns are a particular medium through which citizens   28
form their views and opinions about policy options and give weight to the arguments of 
others. The role of communication media is to transport these arguments. Only the final 
residual of dissent is then decided by a majority voting. The jurisdictional framework, which 
structures the democratic debate, is therefore crucial for the cognitive foundations of policy 
consensus. 
 In the European context, the mechanisms of collective consensus formation are much 
less developed than in the national framework. There exists a network of NGOs, associations 
and lobbying groups that express and contribute to the creation of European-wide policy 
preferences, but often these organisations stand at a great distance to day-to-day decision 
makers on the ground. European citizens are consulted every 5 years when electing a 
Parliament, but the mechanics of party politics and media coverage mostly confines the 
exchange of ideas to the domestic policy context.
21 In addition, the general perception is often 
that participating in the European policy debate has little importance, given that national 
governments maintain the essential power. Because of this institutional set up, convergence to 
a shared theory and the emergence of a European-wide consensus are slow and the 
perceptions of dissensus are enduring. This dynamic is re-enforced by intergovernmental 
cooperation. Because democratic governments wishing to be re-elected need to reflect the 
consensus of their constituency, they have a national bias that perpetuates European 
dissensus. They therefore position themselves as defenders of clearly defined (although not 
necessarily stable) sets of national preferences and interests, and they act as unitary and 
rational players (Moravcsik, 1998). Policy agreement is then obtained as a bargaining 
compromise in the small circle of officials, but rarely as the reflection of the collective 
preferences that would emerge from a fully democratic policy process in Europe.
22 
Governments do not normally create consensus; they reflect it. 
Some have argued that intergovernmental coordination is the appropriate method to deal with 
economic policies in Euroland.
23 The reason is that national governments spend the bulk of 
public money. However, apart from the uncertainties how the intergovernmental approach 
will work in a crisis, the growing public disenchantment with European integration hints at an 
ultimately fatal flaw in the intergovernmental co-ordination method: the growing democratic 
                                                             
21 Contrary to a widely held view, language is not the problem, as the different policy debates in Germany and 
Austria or in France, Belgium and Luxembourg demonstrate. 
22 In any case, the stochastic noise in the variance-covariance matrix of democratic consensus makes the reading 
of the equilibrium vector rather difficult. 
23 See P. Jacquet et J. Pisani-Ferry, 2000   29
deficit. The more areas of competences fall into the domain of European policy-making - and 
the scope increases with the number of collective goods, their externalities and spillover 
effects from integration - the larger is the legitimacy gap in intergovernmental policy 
decisions. The problem results from the fact, that in a democratic system collective 
preferences are translated into government policy through the constitutional mechanism. If the 
public's preferences change, governments and policies will (eventually) adapt or change. 
Hence, democratic decisions remain potentially reversible and therefore open. This is one 
reason why an agreement on the procedure of voting can lead to the acceptance of 
disagreements on substance. Intergovernmental agreements have a different character. Here, 
each government enters negotiations with pre-established preferences (interests and 
objectives), which, in principle, reflect the preferences of its own constituency. During the 
negotiation, governments trade off some of their interests seeking compromise with their 
partners amongst themselves, although without giving feedback to their constituency. 
Economic theory calls this behaviour 'minimising a loss function'. Yet, public opinion in the 
national environment does not necessarily consent to the negotiated outcome. For them a loss 
is a loss, even if minimized and permanent losses create dissatisfaction with a given regime. 
Furthermore, an iron rule of international relations is: pacta sunt servanda. Hence, 
intergovernmental choice can only be reversed when a qualified majority of countries (i.e. 
governments!), decides to do so, but not necessarily the majority of people. This form of 
gerrymandering makes policy changes much more cumbersome and re-enforces the feeling of 
democratic frustration.
24 
 
The need for a European constitution 
 
There are two ways to overcome this problem: one is to revert back to nation-state politics, 
thereby undoing the benefits of integration. This is not unusual. History has seen many cases 
where regional co-operation has disintegrated. Some of the overtones in the debate about 
subsidiarity and the redefinition of competences between the EU, national and regional 
authorities could ultimately lead to Europe's demise, especially after the intake of a large 
number of new countries. For, the level of dissent and potential conflict will increase with the 
                                                             
24 The US presidential elections of 2000 are a reminder of the institutional discrimination that jurisdictional-
based voting can produce. But what is a rare exception in US constitutional reality, is a daily occurrence in 
Europe.   30
number of national actors, unless new structures of consensus building are created.
25 The 
alternative is to delegate more policy-making competences to community institutions. Based 
on our analysis in the previous section, it is obvious that such pooling of sovereignty should 
only apply to areas of significant exclusive collective goods in order to overcome weak 
coordination failure. Delegation has been at the core of European integration over the last 50 
years, particularly in the field of agricultural policy, competition policy, and foreign trade. 
With the creation of the European Central Bank it has taken a new qualitative leap, for the 
coherence of the monetary foundations of Europe are now in one hand. It is only logical to 
build on this experience and generalize it. This is the approach taken by the German foreign 
minister F.J. Fischer in his speech at the Humbold University in May 2000. He noted that the 
traditional Monnet method of integration has reached its limits; a quantum leap in the 
institutional approach was needed. In May 2001, the German Chancellor Schröder followed 
up with ideas on a European constitution. I will not discuss here the political implications of 
these proposals. Instead, I will focus on economic issues and suggest new institutional 
arrangements for defining an optimal policy mix that should be covered by such a 
constitution. 
 
The purpose of institutional reform of economic policy making must be to give aggregate 
fiscal policy a degree of coherence that allows a sustainable optimal policy mix. This requires 
the emergence or a European collective utility function that reflects the consensual weights 
Euroland's citizens attach to different policy options. However, given the decentralized 
incidence of the allocational aspects of fiscal policy, collective choice on many aspects of 
government taxing and spending must remain on a regional/national level. With respect to 
fiscal policy this logic implies delegating the stabilisation function to the European level, but 
leaving the implementation to national governments. Yet, delegation to a higher level is only 
useful and acceptable if it leads to a larger and better European consensus. Therefore, new 
forms of democratic legitimacy are needed that intergovernmental coordination cannot 
produce. This would require disentangling the horizontal and vertical dimensions of collective 
choice. On the vertical side, re-definition of competences between the Union and member 
States is on the agenda since the Nice intergovernmental conference. Horizontally, one would 
have to distinguish more clearly between executive and legislative function. The requirement 
                                                             
25 It has often been reported that Prime Minister M. Thatcher favoured East European enlargement in order to 
weaken the Brussels bureaucracy.    31
of fiscal coherence between the two dimensions would imply defining the aggregate fiscal 
stance by a European executive and legislature. Evaluative conflicts of interests could be 
dampened by a system of transfers or stabilisation funds, as they are in the German model. 
Optimising the economic policy mix would require the definition of a coherent aggregate 
fiscal policy stance which would allow the ECB to set interest rates in response, so that 
potential output is realized. Hence a binding rule or economic constitution for the aggregate 
budget position is needed. But this does not necessarily imply that the execution of this 
budget position must remain at the European level. One could imagine the following 
arrangement. The European executive, presumably consisting of the European Commission, 
would formulate an aggregate fiscal stance after consulting the Eurogroup (acting as a special 
subcommittee of the council). The proposed amount for the European aggregate public 
expenditure and income would have to be approved by the European Parliament and the 
Council. Within this general envelope, national governments would have the freedom to 
define their local budget position, while the coherence between their choices would be 
assured by bilateral bargaining and a stabilisation fund that allows for side payments in the 
bargaining process. This would guarantee the realisation of the agreed aggregate stance.
26 
However, the need for a democratic ratification of the proposed aggregate fiscal position by 
Parliament and Ecofin would establish the democratic dialogue about policy objectives across 
borders that is necessary to create agreement and consensus. The ECB could then optimise the 
policy mix at the given European collective preference point by setting interest rates at the 
appropriate level (See annex). 
 
The idea to separate the macroeconomic dimensions from the nitty-gritty of budget 
negotiations is not new. For example in France under the V. Republic, parliament first 
approves a macroeconomic policy stance (total planned income, total expenditure and deficit); 
only in a second step will it vote on individual titles (arbitrages) which will have to respect 
overall budget coherence. This prevents inconsistent budget decisions that hampered the IV. 
Republic. Along similar lines, one could imagine that national governments delegate the 
formulation of the fiscal policy stance in Euroland to a Community institution and in a second 
step, implement the so defined aggregate fiscal policy stance through their national budgets. 
                                                             
26 The existence of transfers from a stabilization fund are also creating a powerful incentive to stick to the agreed 
policy mix.   32
However, given the prominent role of parliaments in democracies, it is clear that further 
delegation of national sovereignty requires greater democratic legitimacy for the decisions to 
be taken at the Union level. This does not necessarily require a fully blown federal state, but 
the European res publica will need the involvement of its citizens. Only a democratic debate 
and vote across borders about the right options for Europe's economy could create the 
necessary consensus around decisions, which the single currency will make unavoidable. The 
debate launched by the German Foreign Minister J. Fischer has opened new perspectives. 
Bringing them into concrete form is the next step for Europe. 
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Annex 
 
Stefan Collignon 
 
 
 
Policy Mix and National Preferences 
 
 
We will here analyze the formation of collective preferences over a range of possible policy 
mixes. We will first look at a national unitary state, then highlight the structural difficulties 
resulting from the institutional set up in EMU and finally propose a solution for these 
difficulties.  
 
1. The unitary national state. 
Policy mix is understood to mean the combination of monetary and fiscal policy that yields a 
given macroeconomic state. An efficient policy mix is the combination of a monetary policy 
stance (real interest rate r) and budget position ψ  (i.e. the ratio of revenue over primary 
expenditure) that achieves simultaneously full employment and price stability. There is 
neither aggregate excess demand nor excess supply. An optimal policy mix reflects an 
efficient policy mix that maximizes a community's collection utility function. The determinants 
of the efficient policy mix depend on a given economic model, i.e. the exogenous structure of 
parameters (production function, wage bargaining regimes, etc) and our two policy variables. 
In principle, the model could be generalized to any policy domain, but for reasons of 
simplicity, we will assume here a simple IS-LM model with a negative trade-off between 
interest rates and deficits. This trade-off is due to money being a hard budget constraint on 
public finances and risk averse portfolio investment of savers. Macroeconomic equilibrium is 
then represented by a concave function in the (r, ψ )-space. See Figure 1:   34
 
 
All points on the efficient policy line represent feasible policy combinations resulting in non-
inflationary full employment. Points to the right of the line reflect an overly restrictive policy 
mix with insufficient growth, negative output gaps and high and possibly rising 
unemployment. Points to the left reflect excessively loose policies resulting in inflationary 
pressures. An inflationary state A is inefficient and can be pareto-improved by increasing 
interest rates ('Monetarism') or fiscal consolidation ('Keynesianism') or both. In our stylized 
world, Monetarists believe only monetary policy is needed to correct a disequilibrium; 
Keyneysians believe in fiscal policy. The choice of an optimum policy mix consists in 
choosing between two efficient equilibrium states of the world; it is not, in our model, about 
policy instruments needed to reach equilibrium. Point R reflects the 'Republican' short-term 
equilibrium of a Reagan/Volker-type policy mix (tight money, loose fiscal), point D the 
'Democratic' equilibrium of the Clinton/Greenspan mix (tight fiscal, loose money). As is well 
known, neither the Pareto-criterion nor the compensation criterion is of help in deciding 
whether R or D is to be preferred. There are good arguments to assume that D has better long 
r
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run effects on employment creation than R (see Collignon, 1998), but we will neglect this line 
of arguments here.
27 
 
An independent central bank's job is to keep the economy on the optimal line. If monetary 
policy adjustment were without cost, the central bank would be a Stackelberg follower in 
welfare maximization.
28 Different points on the efficient policy line then simply reflect 
different time-preferences for tax payments. Governments reflect their voters' preferences in 
setting the budget. Thus, at D voters prefer a balanced budget and low interest rates. At R they 
have a high time preference for the short term, i.e. for spending today and paying back in the 
future. Obviously, Republicans and Democrats have different utility functions, for from the 
point of view of a Democrat, R lies at a lower indifference curve than D and inversely.
29 
Hence, every point on the efficient policy mix line reflects a strict preference ordering for 
each individual citizen.  
 
The utility functions of different individuals can be distinguished by the relative weight they 
give to the usefulness of monetary and fiscal policy. These weights may differ due to different 
information sets people possess. Taking a Cobb-Douglas utility function, the weight is 
reflected by the parameter α i.
30 α i reflects the weight individual i attributes to interest rates in 
assessing the utility or welfare effects of a policy mix, (1- α i) is the corresponding weight of 
the budget position. In a Cobb-Douglas function they can also be interpreted as a partial 
elasticity with which i's utility assessment of each policy variable changes, when the interest 
rate or budget position changes. 
(1)  Ui = U (r, ψ ) = r
α i ψ
1- α i  
And its log form: 
 (1a)  ln Ui = αi ln r + (1 - αi) ln ψ  
The optimal policy mix that maximizes individual i's utility is given by the slope of the 
indifference curve that is tangent to the efficient policy line: 
(2) 
r i
i
U
U r
d
dr ψ
ψ α
α
ψ
− = − − = ) 1 (  
                                                             
27 The Waigel/Tietmeyer policy mix which dominated Europe in the 1990's reflects an inefficient point to the 
right of the efficient policy line. 
28 Central bank independence is, of course, required in order to ensure an incentive to return to the equilibrium. 
Otherwise the government could enforce an enduring deviation from the optimal policy line. 
29 Figure 1 does not show R's indifference curves which are tangent to the optimal policy line at point R.   36
 
For a given combination of interest rates and budgets, a high weight given to monetary policy 
as a stabilization instrument (high α i) corresponds to a low marginal utility of fiscal policy 
and a flat slope of the indifference curve. Thus, the Republican equilibrium is dominated by 
Monetarism. Inversely, Democrats give low weight to monetary relative to fiscal policy and 
therefore the slope of the utility function at the given efficient policy line is steep. Hence, the 
individual policy preferences between Democrats and Republicans are incompatible. The 
question is, which policy mix will prevail when individual preferences are aggregated into a 
collective policy mix choice?  
 
The answer depends on picking a specific social choice rule (Sen, 1970), which may lead to 
different procedures and results. Here is not the place to review the logical assumptions 
behind different social welfare functions that try to integrate individual utility functions.
31 
What matters, however, is that if collective choices are not based on agreement and 
consensus, individuals lack commitment to adhere to the collective decision. The problem 
with welfare functions based only on individual preferences is that they unnecessarily restrict 
the information set which may be amalgamated to reach a social choice (Lehrer and Wagner, 
1981, p.5). Collective choice based on agreement requires a process that resembles scientific 
discourse (Buchanan, 1991, p.7) and therefore a wider set of information and dialogue. As a 
consequence, models based on traditional welfare functions produce principles and 
recommendations for efficient collective choices, but they fail to explain why people with 
different informational sets would be committed to these principles and precepts. If these 
decisions are nevertheless obliging all members of society, they are in effect dictatorial in the 
Arrow (1951) sense: the preferences of a subset of individuals are ignored and they do not 
agree to have them ignored. By contrast, consensual decision-making allows for neglecting 
some individuals' preferences, but everyone agrees to this neglect in the collective choice 
because it is a rational consequence of consulting the complete information set. For example, 
the Republican may privately prefer the Reagan/Volker policy mix, because he only knows 
Monetarist theory. The Democrat chooses Clinton/Greenspan, because he was trained in 
Keynesianism. After a public debate of pros and cons regarding each policy mix and an 
exchange of relevant information, both individuals pay respect to each other or to some third 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
30 Given that the fiscal parameter is (1- α i), the argument can also be made in terms of fiscal policy. 
31 See Sen, 1977. For a textbook overview see Broadway and Bruce, 1984.   37
(new) authority (a journalist, a finance minister, a Nobel laureate...). Hence, their views might 
converge to consensual weights in the utility function with regard to the two policy 
instruments. The binding effect of a commitment comes as a result of communicative action: 
after the full exchange of information, everyone who can rationally appreciate the situation 
agrees (Habermas, 1987, p.93). If communication does not take place, however, the lack of 
commitment will lead to social disintegration.  
 
Lehrer and Wagner (1981) provide a formal algorithm to model consensus, which we will use 
here to derive a consensual collective utility function. We start in the original position, where 
individual preferences are 'privately' formed (Kuran, 1985), based on an individual's limited 
original stock of information. Each individual assigns a weight α i to monetary policy and (1- 
α i) to fiscal policy in determining their private utility function. Hence the distribution of 
private utilities in society can be written as:  
(3)   up = Ap 
Where up is the vector of the logarithm of private utilities for a n-member society, p is the 
vector of the log value of m policy variables relevant for the optimal policy mix and A is the 
n× m -matrix of coefficients given to each policy variable in equation (1a). We will call A the 
welfare matrix. It has non-negative entries (α ij ≥  0) and row sums equal to one (Σ j α ij = 1). In 
the policy model discussed here, every citizen has an opinion, (about monetary and fiscal 
policy, no "I don't know") so that m = 2 and the dimension of A is n× 2. The task of finding a 
consensual utility function implies finding a rule whereby the individual weight for each 
policy variable converges to a unique equilibrium value ( j j j α α α ... 2 1 = = ). This equilibrium 
weight will reflect the best summary of the total relevant information in society and all n 
members of society will be rationally committed to the social consensus. This convergence is 
achieved by communicative action (Habermas, 1984, p.94-101). It can be modeled as follows. 
Person i (say the Democrat) notes that there is disagreement about the utility of a given policy 
mix, i.e. the coefficient αD she assigned to monetary policy differs from those of others. 
Although she may be highly convinced of her opinion, she may question the reasons and 
motives of others. This new information leads her to assign some weight to the policy views 
of other members of society. This assignment may take the form of a statement like "In 3 out 
of 10 cases, the Republicans might be right." This weight (wik) given by i to another 
individual k's utility coefficient (α kj) reflects the trust and esteem that i holds for k's expertise   38
and reliability. If every individual assigns some trust or confidence in the opinion of herself 
and all others, we obtain the weight matrix 
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We will assume for the moment that every person gives some positive weight to the opinion 
of every other (wik > 0) and to herself (wii > 0) with Σ k wik = 1. It is then rational for a person 
to accept the implications of the weights she assigns and attempt to improve her initial welfare 
matrix by taking a weighted average of the different views in society about policy parameters. 
Hence the person would move from the original state t to a new state t +1, such that: 
(4)   α i, t +1 = wi1 α 1, t + wi2 α 2, t + ... win α n t 
or more generally 
(5)     At+1 = WAt 
Given our assumption of non-negative entries and unit row sum, (5) describes a stochastic 
process known as finite homogenous Markov chain. As is well known, with t →  ∞ , the 
process tends to converge
32 to a unique weight matrix  W W t=  with identical rows, which lead 
to consensual policy parameters. The speed of convergence of each individual's opinion (i.e. 
the number of iterations necessary to reach an infinitesimal deviation) depends on the 
characteristic equation of the weight matrix - i.e. an nth-degree polynomial equation. 
Convergence requires that every root of the characteristic equation is less than 1 in absolute 
value and the closer it is to zero in absolute value, the faster is the speed by which consensus 
is obtained. In general this means that fast convergence and little dissensus requires reciprocal 
weights in the chain of respect. 
 
The consensual collective utility function is:  
(6)   uc = WA p 
where every individual i in the uc-vector agrees to the same preference ranking of policy 
mixes. 
 
This interesting result implies that social consensus can be modeled as the equilibrium value 
of a stochastic process. Dissensus reflects the noise in the variance-covariance matrix.   39
Conflict implies absence of an equilibrium, i.e. disjunctive sets of preferences. A consensual 
collective utility function may be obtained, if some member of the group assigns a positive 
weight to his own views and to at least one other person in the group, provided there is a 
chain of positive respect from each member of the group to every other member of the group 
(Lehrer and Wagner, 1981, p.27). The equilibrium is independent from private utilities, but 
relies on the weight of arguments and the respect that individuals command for their own 
views. Hence in our model of an optimal policy choice in a unitary state, the consensually 
selected combination of monetary and fiscal policy will depend on the respect paid to 
Monetarists and Keynesians to each other. 
 
The model by Lehrer and Wagner gives two conditions for the emergence of consensus:  
•   individual i assigning a positive weight to herself (wii > 0) and  
•   the existence of a chain of respect from individual i to k such that there is some 
sequence of individuals beginning with i and ending with k such that each individuals 
in the sequence respects the individual listed directly after him in the sequence. 
(p.130).  
This implies that in a consensual group not everyone needs to respect everyone else, but that 
there is a chain of respect that links all individuals to the consensus. In a strong formulation, 
consensus even emerges if there is at least one individual such that there is a chain of respect 
from every other individual to k. We may take this as the model for democratic consensus 
where every citizen assigns at least some positive respect, however small it may be, to some 
elected representative (e.g. the president). The democratic debate leads to the emergence of a 
given weight matrix W  from which the public choice of the optimal policy mix results.
33 
 
2. The policy mix in EMU. 
 
In an autarchic world, citizens of other countries do not receive positive weights in the 
domestic policy debate. The chain of respect is broken and foreigners receive zero respect. In 
reality, some foreigners do receive respect, but convergence to consensus is extremely slow. 
Hence, each nation state establishes its own collective utility function and policy preference. 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
32 The convergence is to be seen as a model of information aggregation. Hence it is a synchronic rather than a 
dynamic model of rationality. Lehrer and Wagner, 1981, p.26.   40
As long as each state conducts monetary and fiscal policy separately, conflicting policy 
preferences are not problematic. However, with the creation of European Monetary Union, 
monetary policy has been unified and consequently Euroland has a unified economic structure 
to which corresponds a single efficient policy line. Yet, fiscal policy remains in the national 
domain. The definition of an optimal policy mix takes place on two levels:  
1.  A national preference emerges from the democratic debate among citizens. 
2.  Governments negotiate at the intergovernmental level in order to reach a consensus on 
a European policy mix. 
This has two consequences. First, the optimal policy mix now needs to be formulated in terms 
of a single monetary stance and an aggregated budget position. Second, the 
intergovernmental utility function is necessarily different from the national consensual 
function. For, the national utility function is:    
uN= WA   p    
where  W is a non n× n matrix, i.e. the national utility function makes efficient use of all the 
information relevant for the domestic policy debate. Backed by this national consensus, the 
government then negotiates with others. 
The intergovernmental utility function is: 
uIG=  W G A p     
where G is the weight matrix that governments assign to their reciprocal national weight 
matrices. The G-matrix has the dimension g× g, with g < n, and the original W A matrix of 
dimension n× m has been reduced to g× m by the two-level policy making process. The 
reduction is significant: n is approximately 350 million, even if this matrix involves many 
zero entries; g  is only 12 (!) in Euroland. Thus, the intergovernmental consensus always 
reflects a restricted information set and the commitment by individuals to the negotiated 
policy mix is always less than a fully democratic consensus. Hence, the intergovernmental 
utility function reflects a 'false' democratic consensus, because as a rule  G A W A W G ≠ , i.e. 
the intergovernmental solution overwrites consensual national preferences, without creating 
the binding effect of rational commitment. It takes into account the information set relevant to 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
33 This is the model in its most simple form. We could introduce voting and other decision making procedures as 
a device to cut the iterative process short, when a sufficient initial convergence has taken place.   41
national governments, but not to the entire group of European citizens.
34 How this process 
works in practice is well described by Moravcsik for intergovernmental conferences. It is not 
substantially different from the process of month-by-month policy coordination in the Ecofin, 
even if the role of the Commission and the ESCB is more influential there (parliament's is 
less). Intergovernmental negotiating serves as a learning process in which governments 
transform national preferences into positions and agreements "by encouraging commitment to 
canvass domestic groups [at home - my addition], ascertain the preferences of their foreign 
counterparts and examine the full range of technical solutions" (Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis, 
1999, p. 69). Hence collective preference building at the EU-level does not give positive 
weights and respect to interest groups in other countries, as a single-level model would 
require. Furthermore, if the aggregates weights that people in two countries give to each other 
are low (because they focus on domestic opinion makers), the convergence process is slow 
and dissensus is persistent. This leads to democratic frustration, as individuals form their 
preference in the national contexts of communicative action (democratic debate, media 
network, etc.), only to see that the subsequently realized policy mix does not reflect their 
national consensus on the optimum policy mix. The conflict in this model is radical. 
Intergovernmental decision-making violates a fundamental democratic assumption: the 
political choice is not the amalgamation of the information people possess; every single vote 
does not count. 
The informational constraints of two-level decision-making do not only pose problems to the 
legitimacy of European policy options, but also to their efficiency. For if the binding effect of 
rational commitment is low, the incentives for free riding are high and the quality of the 
policy mix are likely to be sub-optimal (von Hagen and Mundschenk, 2001). Yet, what would 
be the point of defining an optimal policy mix, if member states do not behave in accordance 
with its requirements? 
 
3. Decision making in a federal system. 
The conflict described in the last section reflects weak coordination failure. It could be 
overcome, if we extended our consensus-building group to 'foreigners' and established one-
                                                             
34 This effect is further reinforced by the fact that majority voting stops the convergence to full consensus 
(Lehrer and Wagner, 1981, p. 138; on democracy and consensus see also p. 74-78), thereby excluding half of the 
dissenting population. In a two-level decision making process, this exclusion can take place twice, hence 
potentially excluding up to 75 percent of the popular preferences. 
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level decision-making. As long as there is a chain of respect extending to at least one 
neighbour who himself is part of his domestic chain of respect, the Markov chain would 
eventually yield a European-wide consensus. However, given the uneven distribution (the low 
weight given to one or few foreign individuals) the speed of adjustment in public opinion to 
the new integrated consensus will be slow. If the structures of political decision-making and 
communicative action are such that the respect for the opinions of individuals in other 
member states of Euroland is low, national preferences are likely to dominate policy decisions 
despite the slow convergence to a European-wide consensus. Hence, the efficient formulation 
of an optimal mix in Euroland requires institutional arrangements that facilitate the 
amalgamation of all relevant policy information by each individual living in Euroland. In 
democracies the most efficient instrument to do so are elections, because they require the 
exchange of information and democratic debate during electoral campaigns. However, if 
elections take place locally, the likelihood of giving positive weights to the opinions of non-
voters is low. Instead, efficient democratic consensus on optimal policy requires that policy 
mix decisions, i.e. the definition of the fiscal policy stance is set at a European-wide level by 
an authority that obtains its legitimacy from amalgamating the information from all citizens, 
and not only a small number of governments. The democratically legitimized policy 
consensus should be reflected by a collective utility function of the form 
(7)   uE =  E WA  p  
where  W  is a z× z matrix for n < z. The binding commitment by rational individuals to the 
European cause would be strengthened. 
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